

DTU



Formally Verifying a Theorem Prover for First-Order Logic

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Introduction

Automatic theorem provers have many success stories:

- Ada/SPARK (Rolls Royce, Lockheed Martin, EuroFighter, Collins, ...)
- Dafny
- TLA+ (Microsoft, Intel, AWS, ...)
- Mathematics
- Hardware verification

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...but we are not eating our own dog food!

A few dog treats

Examples of formally verified automatic theorem provers:

- Propositional logic (tableaux), Blanchette et al.
- Clausal first-order logic (ordered resolution), Schlichtkrull et al.
- First-order logic (implicit sequent calculus), Ridge et al.
- First-order logic (implicit sequent calculus), Villadsen et al.
- SAT solver, Fleury
- SAT solver, Maríc

What's missing?

- Optimized proof search procedures
- Heuristics
- Realistic logics
- Proof certificates

Overview of results

- A sound and complete prover for first-order logic with functions
- Based on a sequent calculus
- All proofs are formally verified in Isabelle/HOL
- Human-readable proof certificates

Why did we do this?

- Formalized metatheory for non-trivial sequent calculus provers
- Formal verification of an executable prover
- Novel analytic proof technique for completeness
- Verifiable and human-readable proof certificates
- A prover for the SeCaV system

Sample SeCaV Proof Rules

$$\frac{\text{Neg } p \in z}{\Vdash p, z} \text{ BASIC}$$

$$\frac{\Vdash z \quad z \subseteq y}{\Vdash y} \text{ EXT}$$

$$\frac{\Vdash p, z}{\Vdash \text{Neg} (\text{Neg } p), z} \text{ NEGNEG}$$

$$\frac{\Vdash p, q, z}{\Vdash \text{Dis } p q, z} \text{ ALPHADIS}$$

$$\frac{\Vdash \text{Neg } p, z \quad \Vdash \text{Neg } q, z}{\Vdash \text{Neg} (\text{Dis } p q), z} \text{ BETADIS}$$

$$\frac{\Vdash p [\text{Var } 0/t], z}{\Vdash \text{Exi } p, z} \text{ GAMMAEXI}$$

$$\frac{\Vdash \text{Neg} (p [\text{Var } 0/\text{Fun } i []]), z \quad i \text{ fresh}}{\Vdash \text{Neg} (\text{Exi } p), z} \text{ DELTAEXI}$$

Prover I

- SeCaV rules affect *one formula* at a time
- Our prover rules affect *every applicable formula* at once
- We copy Gamma formulas and remember all terms on the branch
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- Rules affect disjoint formulas
- So we can apply them in any order
- We apply rules *fairly* and repeatedly
- So we never miss out on a proof

Prover II

- We rely on the abstract completeness framework by Blanchette, Popescu and Traytel
- We need to fix a *stream* of rules from the beginning
- Proof attempts are *coinductive trees* grown by applying these rules
- If a tree cannot be grown further, we found a proof
- A function gives the *child sequents* representing the subgoals left after applying a rule
- We export code to Haskell to obtain an executable prover

Prover — proof example

$\text{Neg (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))), \text{Neg } P(0), \text{Neg } Q(0),$	BASIC
$\text{Neg } P(a), \text{Neg } Q(a), P(a)$	
$\text{Neg (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))), \text{Neg (Con } P(0) Q(0)),$	ALPHA CON
$\text{Neg (Con } P(a) Q(a)), P(a)$	
$\text{Neg (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))), \text{Neg (Con } P(0) Q(0)),$	(α)
$\text{Neg (Con } P(a) Q(a)), P(a)$	
$\text{Neg (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))), P(a)$	GAMMA UNI
$\text{Neg (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))), P(a)$	(α, δ, β)
$\text{Imp (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))) P(a)$	ALPHA IMP
$\text{Imp (Uni (Con } P(0) Q(0))) P(a)$	(NEG NEG)

Prover — certificate example

```
Imp (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0]))) (P [a])
```

```
AlphaImp
```

```
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  P [a]
```

```
Ext
```

```
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  P [a]
```

```
GammaUni[0]
```

```
  Neg (Con (P [0]) (Q [0]))
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  P [a]
```

```
Ext
```

```
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  P [a]
  Neg (Con (P [0]) (Q [0]))
```

```
GammaUni[a]
```

```
  Neg (Con (P [a]) (Q [a]))
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  P [a]
  Neg (Con (P [0]) (Q [0]))
```

```
Ext
```

```
  Neg (Con (P [0]) (Q [0]))
  Neg (Con (P [a]) (Q [a]))
  P [a]
```

```
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
```

```
AlphaCon
```

```
  Neg (P [0])
  Neg (Q [0])
  Neg (Con (P [a]) (Q [a]))
  P [a]
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
```

```
Ext
```

```
  Neg (Con (P [a]) (Q [a]))
  P [a]
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  Neg (P [0])
  Neg (Q [0])
```

```
AlphaCon
```

```
  Neg (P [a])
  Neg (Q [a])
  P [a]
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
```


```
  Neg (P [0])
  Neg (Q [0])
```

```
Ext
```

```
  P [a]
  Neg (Uni (Con (P [0]) (Q [0])))
  Neg (P [0])
  Neg (Q [0])
  Neg (P [a])
  Neg (Q [a])
```

```
Basic
```

Prover — escape path example



Soundness I

- If our prover returns a proof, we can build a SeCaV proof
- The SeCaV proof system is sound, so the prover is sound
- We use the abstract soundness framework by Blanchette et al.
- If the *children* of a sequent all have SeCaV proofs, so does the sequent

Soundness II

If the *children* of a sequent all have SeCaV proofs, so does the sequent:

- 1 Assume all child sequents have a proof
- 2 Induction on sequent: use appropriate SeCaV rule for each formula

Example: Our sequent looks like $\text{Dis } P Q, \dots$, so P, Q, \dots is a child sequent with a SeCaV proof. We apply the ALPHADIS rule to prove the sequent using the proof of $\Vdash P, Q, \dots$ (and possibly some reordering).

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \vdots \\
 \hline
 \dots \quad \Vdash P, Q, \dots \quad \text{ASSUMPTION} \\
 \hline
 \dots \quad \Vdash \text{Dis } P Q, \dots \quad \text{ALPHADIS} \\
 \hline
 \vdots
 \end{array}$$

Completeness

- Framework: prover either produces a finite, well formed proof tree or an infinite tree with a saturated escape path
- Need to show that root sequent of a saturated escape path is not valid:
 - Formulas on saturated escape paths form Hintikka sets
 - Hintikka sets induce a well formed countermodel
- ... so valid sequents result in finite, well formed proof trees

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HERE BE DRAGONS



(need to build a bounded countermodel over only the terms in the sequent and ensure functions stay inside its domain)

Bounded semantics

- In a completeness proof for a *calculus* we can assume that Gamma formulas are instantiated with all possible terms
- Thus, we can build a countermodel in the full Herbrand domain
- Our prover only uses terms from the given sequent (and fresh ones)
- So we must build a *bounded* countermodel over this restricted domain
- We must ensure that our function denotation stays inside this domain

Subtypes fail us

- The SeCaV semantics represents the domain as a type variable.
- We cannot build the subtype of terms from a *local* sequent (yet?¹)
- So we represent the domain as an explicit parameter to the semantics
- We have $u, E, F, G \models \text{Uni } P$ iff $u, E, F, G \models P(x)$ for all $x \in u$
- We reprove soundness of SeCaV under this (u)semantics

¹Kunčar and Popescu ITP 2014

Hintikka sets

- We always need at least one term

terms $H \equiv$ if $(\bigcup p \in H. \text{set}(\text{subtermFm } p)) = \{\}$ then $\{\text{Fun } 0 []\}$
 else $(\bigcup p \in H. \text{set}(\text{subtermFm } p))$

- To quantify over in our Hintikka sets

locale *Hintikka* =

fixes $H :: \text{fm set}$

assumes

Basic: $\text{Pre } n \text{ ts} \in H \implies \text{Neg}(\text{Pre } n \text{ ts}) \notin H$ **and**

AlphaDis: $\text{Dis } p \ q \in H \implies p \in H \wedge q \in H$ **and**

BetaDis: $\text{Neg}(\text{Dis } p \ q) \in H \implies \text{Neg } p \in H \vee \text{Neg } q \in H$ **and**

GammaExi: $\text{Exi } p \in H \implies \forall t \in \text{terms } H. \text{sub } 0 \ t \ p \in H$ **and**

DeltaExi: $\text{Neg}(\text{Exi } p) \in H \implies \exists t \in \text{terms } H. \text{Neg}(\text{sub } 0 \ t \ p) \in H$ **and**

⋮

Bounded countermodel

- We carefully build the countermodel

$E S n \equiv$ if $Var n \in terms S$ then $Var n$ else $SOME t. t \in terms S$

$F S i l \equiv$ if $Fun i l \in terms S$ then $Fun i l$ else $SOME t. t \in terms S$

$G S n ts \equiv Neg (Pre n ts) \in S$

$M S \equiv usemantics (terms S) (E S) (F S) (G S)$

- $terms$ is downwards closed, so members evaluate to themselves

$t \in terms S \implies semantics-term (E S) (F S) t = t$

- We have a countermodel to any formula in a Hintikka set

$Hintikka S \implies (p \in S \longrightarrow \neg M S p) \wedge (Neg p \in S \longrightarrow M S p)$

Saturated escape paths form Hintikka sets

- Final step is to inspect the saturated escape paths
- We need to show that the formulas constitute a Hintikka set
- On paper, this follows straightforwardly from our rules
- In practice, it requires fiddly reasoning about the coinductive paths
- In the end: any saturated escape path has a (bounded) countermodel, contradicting the validity of its root sequent

Results

- We have verified soundness and completeness in Isabelle/HOL
- Verification helped find actual bugs in our implementation
- The performance is limited, but optimizations are possible
- Generation of proof certificates is not (yet) fully verified

Where can we go from here?

- New frameworks for integrating heuristics
- Fully verified proof certificate generation
- Verified proof certificate compression
- Frameworks for other proof systems
- Even more realistic logics (e.g. with equality)