## Organization-Oriented Programming in Multi-Agent Systems

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#### Outline

- Agent- and Organization-Centered MAS
- 2 Conflicting decision influences
- 3 A Logic for Qualitative Decision Theory
- 4 Modelling influences and consequences
  - 5 A prototype
  - 6 Conclusion

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- The agent should itself define its relation and contracts with other agents.
- Agents are supposed to be autonomous and no constraints are put on the way they interact.

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## Conflicting decision influences

Obligations 
$$\longrightarrow$$
 Agent  $\longleftarrow$  Desires

An agent, Alice, has a desire to stay at home, but an obligation towards her employer to go to work. What should she do? She knows that she will get fired if she violates her obligation.

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Suggestion: A priori ordering.

- Desires before obligations  $\rightarrow$  Selfish agent
- Obligations before desires  $\rightarrow$  Social agent

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Consider the *consequences* of bringing about a state.

- work  $\rightarrow \neg$  fired
- $\neg$  work  $\rightarrow$  fired

If the agent prefers *not* getting fired, then clearly it should work.

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  - An agent prefers sunny weather.
- which worlds are most normal (or expected)
  - Normally it is not sunny when it is raining.

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- $\Box_P^i \varphi$ :  $\varphi$  is true in all agent *i*'s more preferred worlds.
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Truth in all worlds:  $\overleftrightarrow{\square}_{P}^{i}\varphi = \square_{P}^{i}\varphi \wedge \overleftarrow{\square}_{P}^{i}\varphi$ , similar for normality.

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 $\diamond$ -operators are defined as usual (i.e.  $\diamond_P^i \varphi = \neg \Box_P^i \neg \varphi$  etc).

# $I(B \mid A) \equiv \stackrel{\bigtriangleup_P}{=} \neg A \lor \stackrel{\diamondsuit_P}{\Leftrightarrow} (A \land \Box_P^i(A \to B)) \quad \text{(Conditional preference)}$

$$\begin{split} I(B \mid A) &\equiv & \stackrel{\scriptsize}{\Box}_{P}^{i} \neg A \lor \stackrel{\scriptsize}{\bigtriangledown}_{P}^{i} (A \land \Box_{P}^{i} (A \to B)) & \text{(Conditional preference)} \\ A \leq_{P}^{i} B &\equiv & \stackrel{\scriptsize}{\Box}_{P}^{i} (B \to \diamondsuit_{P}^{i} A) & \text{(Relative preference)} \end{split}$$

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$$I(B \mid A) \equiv \overleftrightarrow{\square}_{P}^{i} \neg A \lor \overleftrightarrow{\bigtriangledown}_{P}^{i} (A \land \square_{P}^{i} (A \to B))$$
 (Conditional preference)  

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$$A \Rightarrow B \equiv \overleftrightarrow{\square}_{N} \neg A \lor \overleftrightarrow{\bigtriangledown}_{N} (A \land \square_{N} (A \to B))$$
 (Normative conditional)

### Abbreviations

#### $P \not\leq_P^i Q \equiv \neg (P \leq_P^i Q)$

#### (Not as preferred)

$$P \not\leq_{P}^{i} Q \equiv \neg (P \leq_{P}^{i} Q)$$
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$$A \leq_{T(C)}^{i} B \equiv (T(A \mid C) \land \neg T(B \mid C)) \lor \qquad ((T(A \mid C) \leftrightarrow T(B \mid C)) \land \qquad (A \leq_{P}^{i} B \lor A \approx_{P}^{i} B)) \qquad (Relative tolerance)$$

$$\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{C}} = \langle \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{O}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{B} \rangle,$$

$$\mathcal{M}_{C} = \langle M, D, O, C, B \rangle,$$

where

• *M* is an extended QDT-model as defined above,

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- M is an extended QDT-model as defined above,
- D is for each agent the set of desires,
- O is the set of obligations,
- C is for each agent the set of controllable propositions,
- *B* is the belief base for each agent.

# Expected consequence

Define the set of potential consequences C'(i) for an agent *i* as follows:

• if 
$$\varphi \in C(i)$$
 then  $\varphi, \neg \varphi \in C'(i)$ 

The expected consequence(s) of bringing about  $\varphi$  is then:

$$\mathit{EC}_i(arphi) = \bigwedge \mathit{C}_arphi$$
 for all  $\mathit{C}_arphi \in \{\mathit{C}_arphi \mid (\mathit{B}(i) \land arphi \Rightarrow \mathit{C}_arphi)$  where  $\mathit{C}_arphi \in \mathit{C}'(i)\}$ 

# Making a decision

The set of influences:  $\mathcal{I}(i) = D(i) \cup O$ 

The set of best influences:

$$Dec(i) = \{A \mid A \in \mathcal{I}(i), \text{ and} \\ \text{for all } B \in \mathcal{I}(i), B \neq A, \text{ either} \\ A <_P^i B, \text{ or} \\ A \approx_P^i B \text{ and } EC(A) \leq_{\mathcal{T}(A \lor B)}^i EC(B) \}$$

# Example

 $D(a) = \{\neg work\}$  $O = \{work\}$ 

### Alice's preferences

- $I(\neg snow \mid \top)$
- $I(\neg work \mid snow)$

- $\top \Rightarrow work$
- snow  $\Rightarrow \neg$  work

# Example

 $D(a) = \{\neg work\}$  $O = \{work\}$ 

### Alice's preferences

• 
$$I(\neg snow \mid \top)$$

### Expectation

•  $\top \Rightarrow \textit{work}$ 

• snow 
$$\Rightarrow \neg$$
 work





### Alice's preferences



### Alice's preferences



### Alice's preferences



$$Dec(a) = \{work, \neg work\}$$

 $BB = \{snow\}$ 

### Alice's preferences



 $BB = \{snow\}$ 

### Alice's preferences



 $BB = \{snow\}$ 

### Alice's preferences



$$Dec(a) = \{\neg work\}$$

# Example — Revised

$$D(a) = \{\neg work\}, \ O = \{work\}$$

Alice's preferences

- $I(\neg snow \mid \top)$
- $I(\neg work \mid snow)$
- $I(\neg fired | \top)$

- $\top \Rightarrow \textit{work}$
- snow  $\Rightarrow \neg$  work
- $\neg$  work  $\land \neg$  snow  $\Rightarrow$  fired

# Example — Revised


$$D(a) = \{\neg work\}, \ O = \{work\}$$

Alice's preferences

- $I(\neg snow \mid \top)$
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- $\top \Rightarrow \textit{work}$
- snow  $\Rightarrow \neg$  work
- $\neg$  work  $\land \neg$  snow  $\Rightarrow$  fired



 $FSW \ F\overline{SW} \ FS\overline{W} \ F\overline{SW} \ F\overline{SW}$   $\downarrow$   $FS\overline{W}$   $\downarrow$   $FS\overline{W}$   $\downarrow$   $FS\overline{W} \ FS\overline{W}$ 

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# Alice's preferencesExpectationFSW FSW FSW FSW $\downarrow$ FSW FSW FSW $\downarrow$ $\downarrow$ $\downarrow$ FSWFSW $\downarrow$ $\downarrow$ FSWFSW

### Alice's preferences



### Alice's preferences



$$Dec(a) = \{work\}$$

# "Social" or "Selfish"?

• In some cases the agent violates its obligation.

# "Social" or "Selfish"?

- In some cases the agent violates its obligation.
- In other cases it ignores its desire.

# "Social" or "Selfish"?

- In some cases the agent violates its obligation.
- In other cases it ignores its desire.
- E.g. leaving early does not have the consequence of getting fired.

# A prototype in Prolog

```
?- decide([~s], Dec).
Dec = [w].
```

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```

Usable in the GOAL agent programming language.

```
main module {
    knowledge {
        #import "decision.pl"
    }
    ...
}
```

• Issues in agent-centered multi-agent systems

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- Prototype

# Questions?